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Economists have debated whether and why the designated hitter (DH) rule in North 
American major league baseball led to an increase in hit-batsmen. We use data from 
Japan's professional baseball leagues, the Pacific League (DH rule) and the Central 
League (no DH rule), to re-examine this question. Initial empirical findings reveal 
increases in hit-batsmen in the Pacific League after we control for the DH’s effect on 
team batting performance. After controlling for interactions between pitcher quality and 
the DH rule, we find that the DH rule induced changes in team defensive strategies and, 
consequently, an increase in hit-batsmen. Subsequent rule changes reduced the 
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  We use data from Japan’s professional baseball leagues to examine 
the effects of the designated hitter (DH) rule on team defensive strategies. 
The DH rule allows another player on the team roster to bat and run the 
bases in place of the pitcher, thereby ensuring that the pitcher never bats. In 
North American Major League Baseball (MLB), the American League (AL) 
introduced the DH rule in 1973 and continues to use it, while the National 
League (NL) has never used the rule. Using MLB performance data, Goff, 
Shughart and Tollison (1997), hereafter GST (1997), found that AL batters 
were hit by pitches more frequently than their NL counterparts during 
DH-rule seasons. They attributed this difference to moral hazard by pitchers, 
arguing that pitchers in the DH-rule league can hit opposing batters of their 
choice with less concern for personal retaliation as the rule exempts them 
from facing opposing pitchers at the plate.1 Trandel, White and Klein (1998), 
hereafter TWK (1998), offered a new estimation equation to measure the 
DH’s effects on hit-batsmen, updated the sample of GST (1997) by adding 
seven seasons (1991-1997), and found that the DH’s effect on hit-batsmen 
was statistically insignificant. TWK (1998) also questioned the moral hazard 
story by arguing that a pitcher merely acts as an agent of his team’s manager 
and that retaliation is rarely directed at pitchers themselves.2 They stressed 
that AL batters are on average better hitters as the DH rule replaces a 
weak-hitting pitcher with a big-hitting slugger and argued that pitchers 
have a lower opportunity cost of hitting sluggers than pitchers. The lower 
opportunity cost of hitting sluggers should lead to more hit-batsmen in the 
AL than the NL. Levitt (1998) also found no evidence that pitchers who frequently hit 
                                                  
1 Batters can, however, charge the pitcher on the mound, and opposing pitchers can also 
retaliate by hitting other players on the pitcher’s team. Since the pitcher cannot bat, 
opposing team managers could order increases in these responses to limit dangerous 
brush-back pitches against their players. 
 
2 Trandel (2004) argued that if a team retaliates when its own batter has been hit, then 
there should be a positive correlation between the number of opposing batters hit by the 
team’s pitchers and the number of hit-batsmen on the team. Using MLB team data for 
1960-2002, he found no evidence of statistically significant correlations between these two 
variables in the full sample or in particular decades. Bradbury and Drinen (2005) used a 
remarkably detailed play-by-play data set for each MLB team to search for retaliation 
against a pitcher who hit a batter. They found that a pitcher was four times more likely to be 
hit when an opposing player had been hit in the previous half-inning. 
 
 1opposing batters are hit more often by opposing pitchers. In response to these 
criticisms, Goff, Shughart and Tollison (1998), hereafter GST (1998), 
acknowledged that the DH effect disappears when the sample period is 
extended through the 1997 baseball season. They hypothesized that the NL 
expansion in 1993 and the players’ strike in 1994-95 may have diluted NL 
pitching and led to more hit batsmen in the NL, thereby diminishing the size 
and statistical significance of the DH effects in the AL. 
This paper has three objectives, the first of which is to use data from 
the two Japanese professional baseball leagues to provide new tests of 
theories showing how the DH rule changed team strategies and pitcher 
incentives to produce an increase in the relative number of hit batsmen in 
the league adopting the DH rule. As in North American MLB, one league in 
Japan—the Pacific League—introduced the DH rule in 1975 and continues 
to use it, while a second league—the Central League—has never used it. The 
parallel rule structures in Japan and North America allow empirical inquiry 
into the effects of the DH rule with a new data set, one which we believe is 
superior to the MLB data set. Unlike MLB, Japanese professional baseball 
did not have a major player strike during the 1958-2004 seasons (our sample 
period) and had a fixed number of teams (six per league) from the 1958 
through the 2004 seasons.3 Japanese baseball experienced a two-game 
player strike in September 2004, but this pales in comparison to the strike in 
1994/1995 in North American MLB which resulted in the loss of the 1994 
post-season and continued into the 1995 season.4 The more stable 
institutional environment for Japanese professional baseball teams should 
serve to improve the reliability of regression estimates of the DH’s impact on 
variables such as the differences in the number of hit batsmen between the 
two leagues, as variations in hit batsmen cannot be due to changes in the 
number of teams or a player strike. 
                                                  
3 Operating with 8 teams between 1901 and 1960, the AL expanded to 10 teams in 1961, 12 
teams in 1969, and 14 teams in 1977. Also operating with 8 teams between 1901 and 1960, 
the NL expanded to 10 teams in 1962, 12 teams in 1969, 14 teams in 1993, and 16 teams in 
1998. 
 
4 None of the empirical results in our paper are affected by whether our sample period for 
Japanese baseball data includes the strike year (2004) or is truncated in 2003. The MLB 
1994/1995 strike began on August 12, 1994, resulted in the loss of the 1994 post-season, and 
was not settled until April 25, 1995 when play resumed after a federal judge ordered that 
the 1995 season begin under the rules of the expired contract. 
 
 2Our second objective is to use less aggregated data—team data 
rather than league data—and panel data estimation techniques to test 
existing theories of the impact of the DH rule on hit-batsmen. Our third 
objective is to extend existing theories of team defensive strategy, which 
focus on the characteristics of the batting team’s hitters, by incorporating the 
characteristics of the defensive team’s pitchers into the empirical analysis.   
We find that the DH rule induced teams to shift their team defensive 
strategy, choosing more aggressive pitching strategies and, consequently, 
more hit-batsmen. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. In Section II, we show that the 
number of hit-batsmen in the Pacific and Central Leagues closely varied 
when neither league used the DH rule; displayed large gaps for 13 years 
after the Pacific League adopted the DH rule; and converged again after 
more strict rules on “dangerous balls” were adopted in 1989. We use 
regression specifications from prior literature to examine whether the 
hit-batsmen differential across the two leagues can be explained by the 
improved batting line-up that results from replacing a pitcher with a 
designated hitter. We supplement this analysis by using more disaggregated 
team data and panel data estimation techniques to test these hypotheses. 
Section III extends existing theories of team defensive strategies by arguing 
that a manager’s pitching strategy is determined by the offensive 
capabilities of opposing batters and the capabilities of his team’s pitchers. 
Using team panel data and a new estimation equation, we find that pitcher 
performance is a statistically significant determinant of team defensive 
strategy. Section IV summarizes the findings. 
 
II. THE DH RULE AND CHANGES IN HIT BATSMEN ACROSS LEAGUES 
 
Figure I provides rates of hit-batsmen (hit-batsmen/10,000 plate 
appearances or HB rates) for the Pacific and Central Leagues since 1958.5 
When the sample period is divided into two sub-periods by the Pacific 
League’s adoption of the DH rule in 1975, the average HB rates are greater 
in the post-DH period in both leagues. As Table I shows, the mean HB rate in 
                                                  
5 GST (1997) and TWK (1998) both use “at-bats” as a basis to normalize hit batsmen 
statistics. We use “plate appearances” because hit batsmen occur as part of plate 
appearances. At bats exclude hit batsmen. 
 
 3the Pacific League increased from 73.3 before 1975 to 81.7 thereafter, while 
in the Central League the mean HB rate was 68.4 before 1975 and 75.0 
thereafter. The difference in the mean HB rate was 4.9 before 1975 and 6.6 
after 1975. Using a t-statistic test for difference in means, the null 
hypothesis that the average HB rates are equal in both leagues cannot be 
rejected at the 5 percent significance level for both the pre-DH and DH 
periods. 
During the DH period, another rule change occurred in the Pacific 
League that could have affected the number of hit batsmen. In July 1982, the 
Acting Chairman of the Pacific League issued a memorandum to league 
umpires, stating that “dangerous balls” should not be tolerated. In 1989, 
both leagues formalized the 1982 Pacific League memorandum by adding a 
clause to the official rulebook prohibiting a pitcher from throwing 
“dangerous balls.”6 An umpire was given the authority to remove the pitcher 
or both the pitcher and his manager from the game when he judged that a 
pitcher had intentionally thrown at a batter. In the same year, the Pacific 
League adopted its own four-pronged guidelines providing umpires with 
more concrete guidance on how and under what circumstances to penalize 
pitchers and their managers for the occurrence of “dangerous balls”.7
We note that the timing of the 1982 and 1989 rules changes is 
roughly consistent with the timing of the declining gap in the HB rate during 
the DH period. After the issuance of the Pacific League “dangerous balls” 
memorandum in 1982, the gap between HB rates in the two leagues 
eventually disappeared over the course of the next seven seasons (1982-1988), 
with almost all of the catch-up occurring between 1985 and 1988. In the 1989 
                                                  
6 The “dangerous balls” clause was added to the 1989 Official Rulebook as Section 8.02(d). 
The section (8.02) in which it was included enumerates a list of prohibited actions for 
pitchers. 
 
7 These four items are: (1) when umpires judge that a pitcher has thrown intentionally at a 
batter, the pitcher and his manager should be immediately removed from the game. This 
applies even when the ball did not actually hit the batter; (2) when the ball hits the batter 
after players in the dugout have verbally instigated their team’s pitcher to throw at a batter, 
the pitcher and his manager should be immediately removed from the game. This applies 
even when the ball did not actually hit the batter, if the umpires judge that the pitcher has 
been engaged in dangerous pitching; (3) a warning is declared when a ball hits the batter on 
the head regardless of the umpires’ judgment whether the pitch was intentional. After the 
warning, any pitcher who hits batters on the head should be immediately removed from the 
game; and (4) umpires have the authority to give warnings to any pitcher they judge to be 
engaged in dangerous pitching, in which case item (3) above applies. 
 
 4season the Pacific League’s HB rate fell (slightly) below the Central League’s 
HB rate for the first time since the introduction of the DH rule in 1975. The 
impact of the “dangerous balls” rule is also supported by the change in the 
mean difference of HB rates across leagues. The average difference in HB 
rates was 4.9 prior to the introduction of the DH rule (1958-1974), which 
increased to 16.2 during the DH period before the dangerous balls rule was 
introduced (1975-1988). A t-test reveals that the difference in HB 
differentials across these two periods is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. After the dangerous ball regime is introduced (1989-2004), the 
mean differential in HB rates across the two leagues falls to –1.7. A t-test 
reveals that the mean differential in HB rates during the dangerous balls 
period (1989-2004) is not statistically different at the 5 percent level from the 
mean differential in HB rates during the pre-DH period.8
We follow these simple difference in means tests with regression 
analyses designed to test both for the existence of changes in hit-batsmen 
across the three periods with different rules (no DH, DH, and DH with 
dangerous balls rule) and for the rationale underlying identified changes in 
team behavior. 
 
Effects of Designated Hitter Rule on Total Hit Batsmen 
  Our first set of regression analyses focuses on documenting changes 
in the annual number of hit batsmen in the two leagues over time. First, we 
replicate GST’s (1997) original regression specification (1) using Japanese 
data from 1958-2004. 
 
(1) Dif-HBt = β0 + β1DHt + β2Dif-PAt + εt 
 
The dependent variable, Dif-HBt, is the difference in hit-batsmen across the 
two leagues in year t. The DHt dummy is one for the Pacific League between 
1975 and 2004, and Dif-PAt stands for differences in plate appearances 
across the two leagues. Second, we rerun the original GST specification with 
                                                  
8 The t-statistic for the null hypothesis that there are no HB differentials between the 
pre-DH period (1958-1974) and DH period with no dangerous balls rule (1975-1988) is 2.929. 
The corresponding statistic for the pre-DH period (1958-1974) and the DH period with the 
dangerous balls rule (1989-2004) is 1.903 which is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
 
 5two DH dummy variables that represent DH rule regimes with and without 
penalties for “dangerous balls” in the following form: 
 
(2)   Dif-HBt = β0 + β1DH1t + β2DH2t + β3Dif-PAt + εt . 
 
One dummy variable, DH1t, covers the 1975-1988 DH period, while a second 
dummy, DH2t, corresponds to the 1989-2004 DH period with the “dangerous 
balls” rule.9 Third, we conduct the same analyses of the normalized (for plate 
appearances) hit-batsmen interleague differences (Dif-HBNt) using TWK’s 
revised regression specification: 
  
(3)  Dif-HBNt = β0 + β1DHt+ εt 
(4)   Dif-HBNt = β0 + β1DH1t + β2DH2t + εt . 
 
OLS regression results with these specifications are presented in 
Table II. As in GST (1997) and TWK (1998), we correct for first-order 
autocorrelation using the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation. Specifications 
with a single DHt dummy [columns 1 and 4) have low explanatory power (R2) 
and are not statistically significant (F-statistic). In addition, estimated 
coefficients for DHt are not statistically different from zero at the 10 percent 
level. These results do not support the proposition that the DH rule led to an 
increase in hit-batsmen. 
When we divide the DH period in two, both the original GST [column 
2] and the normalized TWK [column 5] specifications produced positive and 
statistically significant estimated coefficients for DH1t at the 5 percent level 
and statistically insignificant estimated coefficients for DH2t at the 10 
percent level. These results imply that the DH rule, before specific penalties 
for hitting batters were imposed on pitchers and their managers in 1989, was 
associated with an increase in the number of hit batsmen in the Pacific 
League. 
  It is possible that the observed impact of the DH rule on hit-batsmen 
is merely picking up the effect of the better batting lineup with the DH rule 
on the number of hit-batsmen. As TWK (1998) and Levitt (1998) point out, 
                                                  
9 We also ran this analysis with DH2 specified to begin in 1983, which is the season after the 
Pacific League memorandum on dangerous balls was issued. The results are broadly similar. 
 
 6adoption of the DH rule allows a team manager to have a stronger batting 
line-up by replacing a weak-hitting pitcher with a designated hitter with a 
high slugging average. Aggressive pitching to sluggers comes with the 
expected cost of more hit batsmen going to first base and with the expected 
gain of fewer big hits, due to the effects of brush-back pitches on the batter’s 
concentration and stance at the plate. To the extent that a team manager 
chooses to order pitchers to engage in aggressive pitching more often to 
designated hitters than to pitchers, the number of hit batsmen should be 
greater with the DH rule.   
To test the TWK hypothesis that introduction of the DH rule 
improves the quality of the batting line-up and hence leads to more 
hit-batsmen, we add a widely used measure of batter productivity—the 
difference in league slugging averages (Dif-SAt)—to the GST specification (2) 
and the normalized TWK specification (4) as a proxy for harder-to-measure 
batter quality: 
 
(5)  Dif-HBt = β0 + β1DH1t + β2DH2t + β3Dif-PAt + β4Dif-SAt + εt 
(6)  Dif-HBNt = β0 + β1DH1t + β2DH2t + β3Dif-SAt + εt. 
 
Using league data, we estimate specifications (5) and (6) using OLS and 
correct for first-order autocorrelation using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
transformation. The regression results, reported in Table II [columns 3 and 
6], are virtually identical to those reported for the same specifications 
without Dif-SAt [Table II, columns 2 and 5]. The estimated coefficients on 
Dif-SAt are positive, as predicted by TWK and Levitt, but are not statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
  The estimated coefficients on SAt could be statistically insignificant 
because these regressions were estimated using league data which is the 
sum of data from the six teams in each league. An alternative approach is to 
use team panel data and to employ a fixed effects estimator to obtain 
consistent estimates for the following specification: 
 
(7)  HBit = β0 + β1DH1t + β2DH2t + β3PAit + β3SAit + εit 
 
where teams in the Central League—which have never used the DH 
rule—serve as a control group for teams in the Pacific League. Since team 
 7observations are generated from two distinct clusters—the Pacific League 
and the Central League, there could be cross-sectional correlation due to 
league-specific shocks affecting the number of batters hit on each team and 
to strategic interdependence for teams in a given league. In addition, the 
league regressions alert us to the possibility of AR(1) autocorrelation within 
panels. Since our panels are balanced, i.e., all have the same number of 
observations, and the data are equally spaced in time, we are able to use the 
fixed effect generalized least squares (FEGLS) estimator to estimate 
coefficients in our panel data model. Using FEGLS enables us to obtain 
consistent coefficient estimates in the presence of both autocorrelation 
within panels and cross-sectional correlation across panels (Wooldridge, 
2002, 276-279). We run all regression specifications using two different 
methods for adjusting for autocorrelation within panels: (1) all panels have a 
common AR(1) autocorrelation parameter; and (2) each panel has a unique 
AR(1) autocorrelation parameter. 
  Estimated coefficients for team panel specifications are presented in 
Table III, columns 1 and 2. Regression results are similar when teams have a 
common [column 1] or a team-specific [column 2] autocorrelation parameter. 
The estimated coefficients on team plate appearances (PAit) and team 
slugging average (SAit) are positive and statistically significant at least at 
the 5 percent level, which provides support for the TWK and Levitt 
hypotheses that the number of hit batsmen is positively related to the 
performance of team hitters. However, the estimated coefficients for DH1t 
remain positive and statistically significant at the five percent level, while 
the estimated coefficients for DH2t are not significantly different from zero 
at the 10 percent level. These results reinforce our earlier results: Contrary 
to TWK and Levitt, the DH rule led to independent changes in the number of 
hit-batsmen until rule changes imposed larger penalties on managers and 
pitchers using “dangerous balls” strategies.     
The preceding analyses demonstrate that the DH rule in the Pacific 
League was associated with more hit-batsmen and that a better batting 
line-up was responsible for some but not all of the increase. As GST (1997, 
1998) discussed, the additional effects of the DH rule on hit-batsmen could 
be due to pitchers who maximize their own (rather than team) utility by 
throwing at the batters of their choice. This is an explanation based on moral 
hazard by pitchers who no longer have to face retaliation at the plate. We are 
 8skeptical of this argument because the pitcher is under the direct 
supervision of his manager, who is watching every pitch and every play from 
the nearby team dugout. Since it is the manager who decides which players 
play and for how long, a pitcher’s behavior should reflect his manager’s 
defensive strategy in a game. A pitcher who pays attention to his own 
preferences rather than the manager’s orders is likely to receive comments 
on his behavior from the manager, players, team executives, radio and TV 
broadcasters, and media reporters. Self-indulgent behavior can be found in 
any organization, but the multifaceted and pervasive monitoring of pitcher 
behavior leaves us skeptical that moral hazard is likely to be important in 
this context. Thus, in the next section we investigate other factors which 
may have affected team pitching strategy under the DH rule. 
 
III. THE DH RULE AND TEAM PITCHING STRATEGY 
  
The literature on the DH rule and hit batsmen has focused on 
whether the number of hit batsmen varies with the use of the DH rule and 
how the number of hit batsmen might also be affected by the league or team 
slugging average. We find it striking that so much attention has been paid to 
the quality of the batter faced by the pitcher while virtually no attention has 
been paid to the quality of the pitcher facing the batter. A good pitcher has 
little incentive to hit a player, as the pitcher has the skills (including control 
and speed) to induce a better outcome on average. By contrast, a poor pitcher 
has more incentive to hit a player, as the pitcher has fewer skills and is less 
likely to induce a better outcome from the batter. While the outcome from 
hitting a batter is the same for all pitchers—the batter goes to first base and 
the inning is extended, the cost of hitting a batter is smaller for a poor 
pitcher. Thus, the number of hit batsmen should decrease as pitcher quality 
increases.  
  To test whether the DH rule prompted such a change in strategy, we 
use team panel data and estimate the relationship between a team’s pitcher 
performance (PPit) and the number of opposing batters hit by a team’s 
pitchers (HBPit). Pitcher performance serves as a proxy for the 
harder-to-measure pitcher quality. We measure pitcher performance (PPit) as 
the number of strikeouts recorded by teami pitchers in season t over the 
number of walks they allowed in the same season. This measure of pitching 
 9performance is used as it isolates the productivity of the pitcher rather than 
the joint productivity of the pitcher and his fielders. We use fixed effects 
generalized least squares (FEGLS) to estimate the following specification: 
 
(8)  HBPit = β0 + β1DH1t + β2DH2t + β3PAit + β4PPit + εit.
 
As in our earlier panel regressions, we run all regression specifications using 
two different methods for adjusting for autocorrelation within panels.10 The 
regression results are, however, robust to both methods of adjusting for 
autocorrelation. We report our results in Table III (columns 3 and 4). The 
estimated coefficients on plate appearances by opposing players (PAit) are 
positive, as expected, and statistically significant at the 1 percent level; the 
estimated coefficient on DH1t is positive and statistically significant at the 5 
percent level; and the estimated coefficient on DH2t is positive but not 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. These results are broadly 
similar to those obtained in the panel regressions using offensive 
performance [Table 3, columns 1 and 2]. However, the estimated coefficients 
on pitcher performance are negative, as expected, but also statistically 
insignificant at the 10 percent level. 
  Ideally, the regression specifications should take into account both 
pitching performance and hitting performance. However, incorporation of 
pitching performance into our first set of panel regressions and offensive 
performance into our second set of panel regressions is problematic, as both 
measures are five-team averages and vary little across teams. To incorporate 
team pitching performance and team offensive performance into the same 
regression, we offer a normalized ratio specification with the dependent 
variable being the normalized ratio of opposing batters hit by team i’s 
pitchers and team i batters hit by opposing pitchers (NRHBit); and 
explanatory variables being relative pitcher performance (RPPit) defined as 
the ratio of team pitcher performance to opposing team pitcher performance 
((Kit/Wit)/(Kot/Wot)); relative slugging performance (RSAit) defined as the ratio 
of team slugging performance to opposing team slugging performance 
(SAit/SAot); and the two DH variables, DH1t and DH2t.11 We use a fixed 
                                                  
10 We emphasize to the reader that the dependent variable in specification (8) is not the 
same dependent variable as in specifications (1)-(7). 
 
11 NRHBit is the ratio whose numerator is the number of opposing team batters hit by 
 10effects generalized least squares (FEGLS) estimator to obtain consistent 
coefficient estimates from the following specification. 
 
(9)  NRHBit = β0 + β1DH1t + β2DH2t + β3RPPit + β4RSAit + εit 
 
Results are reported in Table IV, columns 1 and 3. Using a common 
coefficient for adjusting for AR(1) autocorrelation [column 1], we find that 
neither of the estimated coefficients for DH1t and DH2t are statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. However, estimated coefficients on RPPit 
and RSAit have the expected signs and are statistically significant at the five 
percent level.    When a team-specific coefficient for adjusting for AR(1) 
autocorrelation is used, estimated coefficients on RPPit and RSAit still have 
the expected signs, but RSAit is not statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. From these results, we conclude that team pitching performance 
should be included in regressions attempting to explain relative or absolute 
number of hit batsmen. These results are also highly supportive of the TWK 
and Levitt view that the DH rule has no independent effect on the number of 
hit batsmen once other co-variates that influence the number of hit batsmen 
are introduced to the regression.     
Finally, we consider whether the pitching strategy of a baseball team 
is affected by the DH rule. Compare the strategies of managers from teams 
with high-quality and low-quality pitching staff: It is the manager of less 
talented pitchers who is more tempted to use hit batsmen as a means of 
minimizing the damage incurred by opposing teams’ sluggers. A team with 
more talented pitchers does not choose this strategy as often, since its 
pitchers can retire opposing teams’ batters more easily. For a team with 
low-quality pitchers, one obstacle to using this strategy is that its pitchers 
may fear personal retaliation at the plate from the other team’s pitchers. 
Managers pay attention to these concerns, as they could affect their pitchers’ 
mental or physical capabilities to carry out their assigned duties. Once the 
DH rule is adopted and pitchers can completely escape this particular form 
of retaliation, a manager finds it easier to instruct his pitchers to engage in 
aggressive pitching which includes brush-back and beanball pitches.12 To 
                                                                                                                                                  
teami’s pitchers normalized by the opposing batters’ plate appearances, and denominator is 
the hit batsmen received by teami’s batters normalized by their plate appearances. 
 
12 It should be noted that the hypothesis of aggressive pitching by poorly pitching teams 
 11test this hypothesis, we use a fixed effects generalized least squares (FEGLS) 
estimator to obtain consistent coefficient estimates from the following 
specification which includes interaction terms between RPPit, and RSAit with 
DH1t and DH2t: 
 
(10)  NRHBit = β0 + β1DH1t + β2DH2t + β3RPPit + β4RSAit + β5DH1t *RPPit + 
β
t
                                                                                                                                                 
6DH2t *RPPit + β7DH1t *RSAit + β8DH2t*RSAit + εit. 
 
Our initial regressions provided estimated coefficients on 
DH1t*RSAit and DH2t*RSAit that were not statistically significant from zero 
at the 10 percent level, and we dropped these two variables from subsequent 
regressions. We report results using common and team-specific AR(1) 
autocorrelation coefficients in Table IV, columns 2 and 4. In both 
specifications, the estimated coefficients on DH1t become positive and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while the estimated 
coefficients on DH1  *RPPit are negative and statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. 
What is the net effect of the DH rule in these two specifications?   
For both specifications, the DH rule has a small net positive effect (.01 with 
common AR(1);.02 with team-specific AR(1)) at the mean RPPit, a net 
positive effect (.24;.22) at the minimum RPPit, and a net negative effect 
(-.28;-.24) at the maximum RPPit.13 Both specifications support the 
hypothesis that some Pacific League teams responded to the DH rule by 
altering their pitching strategies as pitcher quality varied. As we discuss 
below, this finding poses difficulties for econometricians trying to detect 




  The results from our regression analyses of Japanese professional 
 
under the DH rule rests on the potential for personal retaliation and does not require that 
retaliation actually take place. The correlation coefficient between team pitcher-HBs and 
team batter-HBs (in terms of their divergence from league averages) for Japanese teams in 
1958-2004 is –0.145, which does not provide evidence of retaliation. This parallels Trandel’s 
(2004) findings for MLB. 
 
13 These calculations are based on RPP summary statistics for the Pacific League teams 
(mean 1.0198; minimum 0.5867; maximum 1.5946).   
 12baseball league data generally support the hypothesis that the DH rule led 
to more hit batsmen until rule changes in 1989 prohibited pitchers from 
intentionally throwing dangerous pitches at a batter. It is notable that the 
impact of the DH rule can be isolated in Table III even after we control for 
the improved team batting line-ups in the Pacific League after the 
introduction of the DH rule and for team pitcher quality. These new findings 
using Japanese data stand in contrast to TWK’s (1998) and Levitt’s (1998) 
findings using North American MLB data—that the increase in hit-batsmen 
in the American League during the DH era was well within the range that 
would be observed due to improvements in the batting line-ups of AL teams.     
  Our unified regression framework in Table IV produces more varied 
results across different regression specification. Those specifications using 
just DH dummies produce estimated coefficients on DH1 and DH2 that are 
statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level. However, regression 
specifications using DH dummies and interaction terms between player 
productivity and DH1 produce estimated coefficients for DH1t and for the 
DH1t*RPPit interaction terms that are statistically significant at the 5 
percent level.   
  The estimates from the interaction specifications lead us to infer that 
teams changed pitching strategies in response to the DH rule. Of course, the 
estimated coefficient on DH1 could also be picking up the effects of pitcher 
moral hazard. And that result poses a new problem for researchers:    Once 
the introduction of the DH rule induces changes in pitching strategies 
towards batsmen of a given quality, it becomes more difficult to distinguish 
econometrically whether increases in hit batsmen were due to pitcher moral 
hazard or to changes in pitching strategies ordered by the team manager.   
Perhaps our results should serve to remind us that pitching a baseball to a 
batter is far from a bright line enterprise; that a pitcher’s control over his 
toolkit of pitches varies across games, start times, seasons, and stadiums; 
that team managers often struggle to “figure out” and properly manage the 
modern player; and that there may typically be some, very limited space for 
team pitchers to indulge their preferences while facing batters from the 
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 14TABLE I. Hit Batsmen Rates (Hit Batsmen/10,000 Plate Appearances) 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
  Pre-DH  Rule  Post-DH  Rule  Pre-Dangerous    Post-Dangerous 
  1958-1974  1975-2004  Balls  Rule    Balls  Rule   
      1975-1988  1989-2004 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
 
Pacific   73.3   81.7   87.1   76.9 
League   (14.7)   (15.5)   (11.5)   (17.3) 
 
Central   68.4   75.0   70.9   78.6 
League   (16.4)   (13.3)   (12.3)   (13.4) 
 
League   4.9   6.6   16.2   -1.7 
Difference (10.0)    (13.8)   (11.3)   (10.0) 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
 15TABLE II. OLS Estimates of Hit Batsmen Differences between Pacific and Central 
Leagues: 1958-2004 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Dependent  HB Difference        Normalized  HB  Difference      
Variable    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
DH   7.16     3.45 
  (0.37)     (0.56) 
 
DH1    34.48**  36.29***    11.50**  12.63*** 
   (2.48)  (2.73)    (2.69)  (3.05) 
 
DH2    -16.22  -17.68    -5.78  -5.70 
   (1.21)  (1.37)    (1.39)  (1.46) 
 
Plate App.  0.002  0.01  0.005 
Differences  (0.31) (1.09) (0.67) 
 
Slug  Ave     258.34     72.99 
Difference    (1.08)     (1.00) 
 
Intercept  14.39 12.22 10.99    3.74 4.44 3.50 
  (0.87)  (1.17)  (1.09)    (0.73) (1.50) (1.20) 
 
Adjusted R2  -0.042  0.239 0.274   -0.015  0.249 0.283 
F-statistic  0.09 5.71 5.25   0.32 8.45 6.91 
 
rho    0.466 0.102 0.046   0.461 0.121 0.057 
DW(corrected) 2.080 1.842 1.848   2.046 1.852 1.851 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10% (***) and 5% (**) level. 
 16 TABLE  III:  Fixed-Effects  GLS  Estimates of Hit Batsmen by Team: 1958-2004 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Dependent  Hit Batsmen (team batters)  Hit Batsmen (by team pitchers) 
Variable   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
  (ar1)   (psar1)   (ar1)   (psar1) 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
DH1   4.498**   3.655**   5.839**   7.534*** 
  (2.47)   (2.28)   (2.50)   (3.39) 
 
DH2   0.838   -0.441   0.901   2.902 
  (0.46)   (0.28)   (0.39)   (1.32) 
 
Plate   0.012***   0.013***   0.017***   0.017*** 
Appearances (4.42)    (4.91)   (6.22)   (6.39) 
 
Slugging   32.893**   37.437*** 
Average     (2.57)   (3.01) 
 
P i t c h e r        - 1 . 0 4 1    - 1 . 1 1 1  
Performance      (1.07)   (1.20) 
 
Intercept  -37.33***  -44.194*** -46.681*** -46.685*** 
    (3.07)   (3.69)   (3.21)   (3.33) 
 
Log-L   -1954.70   -1951.56   -1932.38   -1925.81 
 
Wald chi   53.40***   63.28***   60.06***   70.15*** 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Note: Autocorrelation within panels are assumed to be common across all panels (ar1) 
or to be unique to each panel (psar1). z-statistics are in parentheses. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% (***) and 5% (**) levels. 
 17TABLE IV: Fixed-Effects GLS Estimates of Normalized Hit-Batsmen Ratio 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Dependent  Normalized    Normalized    
Variable   HB-Ratio (ar1)      HB-Ratio  (psar1)     
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
DH1   0.012   0.542***   0.017   0.490** 
  (1.13)   (2.64)   (1.39)      (2.38)   
 
DH2   -0.007   0.166   -0.003   0.113   
  (0.68)   (0.74)      (0.25)   (0.51) 
 
RPP   -0.258***  -0.163*   -0.266***  -0.198*** 
  (3.49)   (1.91)   (3.85)     (2.55)     
 
RSA   -0.376**   -0.383**   -0.257   -0.250   
  (1.99)   (2.06)   (1.45)     (1.42)     
 
DH1*RPP    -0.518**     -0.458** 
  (2.58)     (2.28) 
 
DH2*RPP    -0.170     -0.111 
    ( 0 . 7 8 )      ( 0 . 5 1 )  
 
Constant  1.683***   1.595***   1.565***   1.489*** 
  (8.81)   (8.29)   (8.64)   (8.12) 
 
Log-L   -46.70   -43.88   -44.60   -42.84 
 
Wald chi   21.32***   29.51***   21.18***   27.70***  
Note: Autocorrelation within panels is assumed to be common across all panels (ar1) or 
to be unique to each panel (psar1). z-statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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